With apparently reckless abandon, the major banking institutions increased their risk exposure, and the system of CEO compensation not once put on the brakes as hoped. So, we all know the outcome: Men like Jamie Dimon, Lloyd Blankfien, Dick Fuld earned $100 of millions before the companies they ran went insolvent (oh, wait: They didn't actually have to declare bankruptcy, we bailed them out!) With no money back for our effort.
How can CEO pay be restructured so that it provides the proper incentives to the individuals running the show? How can it require longer term exposure, so that risky bets that pay short term (but may fail spectacularly later) are fully carried as a liability to the CEO, so that they have to wait for maturity also to get paid?
I've had some ideas, but I really like it when those more familiar with the financial system get involved. So I was particularly interested to read this open letter from Yves Smith (of naked capitalism) to Sheila Bair (Chairwomen, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation). She starts out with some good observations, specifically that we (the communities) end up paying the excessive CEO pay without a good return:
Dear Chairman Bair,
America can no longer afford to have a banking system that serves the ends of its executives rather than those of taxpayers and communities who have been saddled with cost of reckless profit-seeking. The FDIC proposal to tie deposit insurance premiums to the incentives in executive compensation programs would be an important step forward towards making sure that bank managers operate in a way that reflects the value of the extensive government support and safety nets they enjoy. Bank officers should not be encouraged, as they are now, to take “heads I win, tails you lose” bets with deposits.
There is no question that the annual accounting/bonus cycle is badly out of line with the time horizon of many of the wagers that financial institutions take. Unfortunately, the belief that using stock options or restricted shares as an important part of compensation would lead to responsible behavior has proven wildly false. Both Bear Stearns and Lehman had substantial equity ownership at both the executive level and among the rank and file. By contrast, when Wall Street was dominated by private partnerships, so the management group was jointly and severally liable for losses, the sort of profligate risk-taking that took place in the run-up to the global financial crisis was virtually unheard of.
Along the way, Ms. Smith observes that 'every academic study' that she has seen on bank size is inversely correlated: Bigger banks do not gain an efficiency that allows them to run cheaper, contrarily, they have higher cost to asset ratios. But, it balloons executive pay (and the outgoing execs as the result of a merger are given hefty golden parachutes.)
And so to the meat of her request:
I strongly encourage the FDIC to remove the incentive for executives to bulk up their banks solely to pay themselves more. One way might be to require that executive bonuses be set in relationship to the pre-acquisition peer group for a substantial initial period (at least three years, better yet five) and be benchmarked against the new peer group of bigger banks only if the merged entity had met certain operational performance targets.
There's substantially more, plus a link to the current FDIC proposal, along with enlightened remarks by many readers at naked capitalism.
Let's face it: Any institution that has grown 'Too Big Too Fail' is really just too big to exist under our current scheme, for the monopolistic power it then holds over the entire economy suppresses advancement, both for individuals and society. If the incentives for executive pay give them incentives to grow their companies without regard to long term survivability or potential damage to other entities and communities, then those incentive structures are wrong.
Because our goal is a wealthy society, as much as possible free from the scourges of poverty, and because the means to achieve that goal have been to allow individual monetary enhancement does not mean that we can't curb individual takings when those takings prove disastrous to our goal. I'm heartened that there is finally some work being done - although this is only a first step, unless we can remove the spectre of 'Too Big Too Fail', we will always have to live with the threats of Deep Recessions or future Depressions.
Good Work, Yves!